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COURT-MARTIAL JURISDICTION OF CIVILIAN
DEPENDENTS
On June io, 1957, the Supreme Court of the United States decided
Reid v. Covert,1 together with Kinsella v. Krueger, reversing its pre-
vious decisions of exactly fifty-two weeks' standing.2 Both the defen-
dants were convicted in court-martial proceedings of murdering their
husbands, who were then in the military service overseas. The con-
stitutionality of article 2(11) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice,3
which authorizes court-martial jurisdiction over civilian dependents
accompanying servicemen overseas, was thus put in issue. The answer
given to the issue presented, however, was not as clear as one might
have wished. Questions remain unanswered, problems unsolved, and
the future uncertain. Before conclusions as to the ramifications of this
case can be arrived at, it is first necessary to gain a clear understanding
of the decision.
I.
Four Justices wrote opinions in this case. The most practicable
method for examining their divergent approaches is a comparison.
By this means the whole may be kept united while examining each
view separately. First it is necessary to look at the position for which
each of the opinions, standing alone, may be cited. The judgment of
the Court was announced by Justice Black, with whom the Chief Jus-
tice and Justices Douglas and Brennan concurred. Justice Black
says that civilian dependents accompanying servicemen overseas may
not constitutionally be tried by court-martial for offenses committed
while overseas. Justice Clark, joined by Justice Burton, maintains
that such trials are constitutional. Justices Frankfurter and Harlan,
while writing separate opinions, confine their concurrence with the
decision of the Court to capital cases in time of peace. There was
1354 U.S. (1957). Hereinafter referred to as Covert or the Covert case.
2Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470 (1956) and Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487 (1956).
364 Stat. io9 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 552 (1952):
"The follow persons are subject to this code:
"(ii) Subject to the provisions of any treaty or agreement to which the United
States is or may be a party or to any accepted rule of international law, all persons
serving with, employed by, or accompanying the armed forces without the conti-
nental limits of the United States. ... "
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no majority opinion as such. Only on the narrow ground stated by
two concurring Justices, which is necessarily included in the opinion of
the Court, can it be said that a majority of the Justices joined. What
the result would be if a noncapital case, or one not arising in time of
peace, were presented to the Court can only be speculated upon.
4
In reaching their respective decisions, the Justices found it neces-
sary to determine whether the constitutional guarantees, and more
specifically whether those guarantees found in article III, section
25 and the fifth6 and sixth amendments,1 apply outside the territorial
limits of the United States, and, if so, to what extent.
Justice Black takes the view that the United States, being entirely
a creature of the Constitution and deriving all its authority from that
instrument, may act only within all its limitations. Article III, section
2, the fifth and sixth amendments, continues Black, being all-inclusive
in their language, apply wherever this country's authority is exercised.
They cannot be disregarded merely because the subject of congres-
sional regulation is in a foreign land. When the Covert case came to
the Supreme Court the first time, the then majority relied heavily, but
erroneously, says Justice Black, on In re Rosss and the Insular Cases0
for the proposition that these guarantees do not apply to citizens
abroad. The Ross case upheld the validity of consular court jurisdic-
tion created by an act of Congress authorizing American consuls to
try citizens in Japan for crimes allegedly committed while in that
country. "The Ross approach that the Constitution has no applicability
'Justice Whittaker took no part in this case.
'U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. "The Trial of all Crimes ... shall be by Jury."
Ou.S. Const. amend. V. "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury,
except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger...."7U.S. Const. amend. VI. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been pre-
viously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the ac-
cusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory pro-
cess for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defence."
8140 U.S. 453 (1891). Hereinafter referred to as Ross.
gThe Insular Cases are a series of cases decided around the turn of the nine-
teenth century sustaining the "right of Congress to make laws for the govern-
ment of territories, without being subject to all the restrictions which are imposed
upon that body when passing laws for the United States, considered as a political
body of States in union...." Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 142 (19o4). E.g.,
Balzac v. People of Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922); Perez v. Fernandez, 2o2 U.S.
8o (19o6); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 19o U.S. 197 (19o3); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S.
244 (0O); American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 7 U.S. (i Pet.) 685 (1828).
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abroad has.., been directly repudiated.... At best... [it] should be
left as a relic from a different era."'10 Justice Black distinguishes the
Insular Cases from Covert on the ground that they dealt with the
power of Congress "to make all needful Rules and Regulations re-
specting the Territory":" of the United States whereas here the basis
of power is citizenship.
Justice Clark's opinion, although not espousing a view diametrically
opposed to that of Justice Black, states that citizens are not entitled as
a matter of right to trial before an article III court 2 for crimes com-
mitted in a foreign country. The dissenting Justice does not contend
that the Constitution itself is operative only within the geographical
confines of the United States. It is, for him, a question of whether
the guarantees in issue extend to these petitioners overseas. The an-
swer given is that they do not. Ross was not cited for the proposition
which was correctly criticized by Justice Black. Rather it was cited,
as were the Insular Cases, for the contention that Congress is not
hindered by these guarantees in legislating with respect to citizens
outside the territorial limits of the United States.
Justices Frankfurter and Harlan rely on these cases for still a
different proposition. They are cited for the proposition that the
constitutional provisions relied upon by Justice Black do not auto-
matically apply outside the territorial limits of the United States. It
becomes a question of the applicability of these guarantees in the
light of the circumstances, a problem closely akin to that of due pro-
cess. Justice Frankfurter would agree with Justice Black that inasmuch
as Ross stands for the proposition that the Constitution does not op-
erate outside the United States the case is no longer authoritative on
that point. Justice Black thinks this case has no further value as a
precedent, while the two concurring Justices maintain that Ross is
still relevant for the analysis employed in determining which should
apply under the circumstances. The two Justices cite the Insular Cases
for a proposition similar to Ross, thus again denying that these
"°354 U.S. 1, 12o (1957).
u'U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2.
FEx parte Bakelite Corp., 297 U.S. 438, 449 (1929). "Those [courts] established
under the specific power given in section 2 of Article III are called constitutional
courts. They share in the exercise of the judicial power defined in that sec-
tion, can be invested with no other jurisdiction, and have judges who hold office
during good behavior, with no power in Congress to provide otherwise. On the
other hand, those created by Congress in the exertion of other powers are called
legislative courts. Their functions always are directed to the execution of one or
more of such powers and are prescribed by Congress independently of section 2
of Article III.
82 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XV
cases flatly state that the protections in the Constitution do not apply
abroad. The views expressed on these matters by Justices Frankfurter
and Harlan seem preferable to those of Justice Black or Clark in that
these cases, although distinguishable as to the actual constitutional
power involved, are similar in approach to the problem here pre-
sented. They both involve a contrast of guarantees on the one hand
with power on the other and should not be disregarded as mere relics of
a bygone era or distinguished solely on the basis of the power involved.
Justice Clark, thus finding that Congress is not hindered by the
guarantees expressed in article III, section 2, the fifth and sixth amend-
ments when creating courts outside the United States, concluded in
his 1956 opinion that there was no need to examine the power of
Congress under article I to make rules for the government and regula-
tion of the land and naval forces.13 Here there is an evident incon-
sistency. Justice Clark's 1957 opinion incorporates his prior 1956
opinion.14 Consequently, the two must be read together. His first
opinion states that Congress may admittedly create legislative courts
to try American citizens abroad; and since court-martial tribunals
have already been created, these tribunals may be utilized to try citizens
abroad without the necessity for justifying such jurisdiction under
article I.15 In his second opinion, however, court-martial jurisdiction
is justified on the ground that the regulation of these dependents is
reasonably related to the government and regulation of the land and
naval forces under article I, section 8, clause 14. There is no ex-
planation offered by Justice Clark for this inconsistency. The state-
ment to the effect that there was no need to examine the power of
Congress to enact article 2(11) is open to grave criticism, for in a
government of enumerated powers such as ours, when an act of a legis-
lative body is squarely before the court, it cannot be upheld if there
is no power to enact it.16 The question of power must be answered.
Justice Black, in answering that Congress lacks the requisite power,
declares that only military personnel are included in article I, section
8, clause 14. That group is not to be expanded by means of the neces-
sary and proper clause' 7 to include persons other than those described
13Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470, 476 (1956).
14354 U.S. 1, 79 (1957). Justice Clark states in his 1957 opinion: "I remain con-
vinced that the former opinions of the Court are correct and that they set forth
valid constitutional doctrine .... We do not include a discussion of the theory upon
which those former judgments were entered because we are satisfied with its hand-
ling in the earlier opinions."
',Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470, 476 (1956).
'6Marbury v. Madison, i U.S. (1 Cranch.) 368, 388 (18o3); Federalist, No. 78.
1
7 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, c. 18.
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within that clause. Congress may thus enact any legislation necessary
and proper for the government and regulation of that group only. To
allow military trials of civilians, according to Justice Black, would be
"inconsistent with both the 'letter and spirit of the constitution,' "s
since these military tribunals exercise an extraordinary jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction of military tribunals should be strictly confined so as not
to encroach upon that of the civil courts, which provide the usual
preferred mode of trial.19 The legal system of the military is charac-
terized by Justice Black as a rough sense of justice which should be
allowed no operation outside the limited confines of the land and naval
forces.2
0
Justices Frankfurter and Harlan, on the other hand, take a different
view of the power under article I. Although the result reached by
these Justices is similar to that of Justice Black, their approach is sub-
stantially different. Disagreement with Justice Black is voiced in
their interpretation of clause 14 as it is affected by clause 18, the neces-
sary and proper clause. Construing these two clauses together, the two
concurring Justices agree with Justice Black that the only persons
who may be placed under court-martial jurisdiction are those who
are close enough to the land and naval forces so that their regulation
is necessary and proper to the government and regulation of the armed
forces. This difference in interpretation of clause 18 is the crux of the
split in the Court. Justice Harlan states: "I cannot accept the impli-
cation of my brother Black's opinion that this Article I power was
intended to be unmodified by the Necessary and Proper Clause of the
Constitution, and that therefore this power is incapable of expansion
under changing circumstances. The historical evidence... shows quite
the opposite.' 21 On the same subject Justice Frankfurter says: "The
Court's function in constitutional adjudications is not exhausted by
a literal reading of words. It may be tiresome, but it is nonetheless
vital, to keep our judicial minds fixed on the injunction that 'it is a
constitution we are expounding'.
'22
935 4 U.S. 1, 22 (1957)-
"Justice Black further contends that because "cases arising in the land or
naval forces" were excepted from the fifth amendment (see note 6 supra), it is
"persuasive" that the framers of the Constitution intended clause 14 to encompass
only persons "in" the military. Military subordination to civilian authority which
has been firmly implanted in the history of this country has continued through
the expression of the framers of our constitutional government and is another rea-
son why all jurisdictional extensions of the military should be opposed.
:OBut see Hamilton, Military Law: Drumhead Justice is Dead!, 43 A.B.A.J.
797 (1957).
2354 U.S. 1, 67-68 (1957)-
-11d. at 43.
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The Justices next determine whether these dependents are "close
enough" to the land and naval forces so as to make them amenable
to court-martial jurisdiction under article I, section 8, clause 14. Justice
Clark, although not discussing the necessary and proper clause, does
conclude that dependents bear sufficient relation to the military to be
within the scope of clause 14. Justices Frankfurter and Harlan, because
of their determination that the personal safeguards found in article III,
section 2, the fifth and sixth amendments will or will not apply out-
side the United States according to the circumstances, resolve this
"close enough" test in the light of these safeguards.
Their opinions are to the effect that dependents overseas, at least
in capital cases in time of peace, cannot constitutionally be tried by
court-martial. The reasoning of the two Justices is basically the same,
but their approaches to the common end vary. Justice Frankfurter rea-
sons that the determination of whether these dependents are "close
enough" to the military to justify the enactment of article 2(11) of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice must involve a consideration of the
loss of certain safeguards enumerated in the Bill of Rights. When these
consequences are considered, the trial of civilian dependents by court-
martial, he concludes, "is hardly to be deemed, under modern con-
ditions, obviously appropriate to the effective exercise of power to
'make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and
naval forces'...."23 Justice Harlan divides his reasoning on this point
into two parts. In the first he maintains that article I, section 8, clause
14, examined apart from the rest of the Constitution, allows the court-
martialing of dependents because of their close relation to the military
and because of the propriety of their regulation in order "to insure the
effective governance of our overseas land and naval forces. '24 In the
second he says this jurisdiction nevertheless cannot be maintained if
the defendants are guaranteed trial in an article III court. In view
of the determination that the constitutional guarantees of article III,
section 2, the fifth and sixth amendments do not automatically apply
overseas, the decision as to which provisions should apply under the
circumstances becomes a question of judgment, similar to that applied
in due process cases. Looking at these circumstances, Justice Harlan
concludes that in capital cases, where great procedural fairness is re-
quired, it is essential in time of peace that defendants such as these
should be protected by article III, the fifth and sixth amendments.




of Military Justice is unconstitutional as applied to civilian defendants,
at least in capital cases arising in time of peace. Congress has not re-
pealed or altered this article, so, presumably, dependents accused of
crimes less than capital may still be tried by courts-martial. This result
is reached, as explained above, because of the limited concurrence of
Justices Frankfurter and Harlan to Justice Black's opinion, which goes
beyond the actual scope of the controversy presented.25
II.
The gravest problem to arise out of this decision is the jurisdic-
tional status of a civilian dependent who has committed a crime while
accompanying one of our servicemen overseas. The setting is some-
what changed from that existing when the crimes involved in Covert
and Krueger were committed. At that time the United States had cer-
tain international agreements with Great Britain and Japan granting
to our military courts exclusive jurisdiction over offenses committed in
these countries by servicemen or their dependents. 26 Now, the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization Status of Forces Agreement is in effect.27
As between the member nations, this agreement grants to the military
authorities of the sending State primary jurisdiction in a factual situa-
tion similar to the one presented in the Covert case.28 After this case,
however, we are left with a curious result. Not only is our primary juris-
diction nullified, but the receiving nation would now have exclusive jur-
=Compare Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936),
with United States v. Sullivan, 332 US. 689, 693 (1948).
"57 Stat. 193 (Great Britain); 3 U.S. Treaties & Other Int'l Agreements 3341,
T.I.A.S. No. 2492 (Japan).
74 U.S. Treaties & Other Int'l Agreements 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846.
24 id. art. VII. "i. Subject to the provisions of this Article, (a) the military
authorities of the sending State shall have the right to exercise within the receiving
State all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the law of
the sending State over all persons subject to the military law of that State;
(b) the authorities of the receiving State shall have jurisdiction over the mem-
bers of the force or civilian component and their dependents with respect to
offenses committed within the territory of the receiving State and punishable by
the law of that State.
"3. In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent the follow-
ing rules shall apply:
(a) The military authorities of the sending State shall have the primary right to
exercise jurisdiction over a member of a force of a civilian component in relation
to
(i) offenses solely against the property or security of that State, or offenses
solely against the person or property of another member of the force or civilian
component of that State or of a dependent .... "
195 8]
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isdiction over these persons. 29 Since Covert can only be cited for its hold-
ing in relation to capital cases, presumably the United States still has
primary jurisdiction when the crime is less than capital. 30 Since civilian
dependents are not subject to military law in capital cases, this treaty
does not protect them and they would be triable by the receiving na-
tion under the rules of international law.
As a consequence of the ruling in Covert, what may this country do
in order to regain at least the jurisdiction the treaty purported to ex-
tend? There are three possibilities.3 1 In considering these alternatives,
the provisions of the treaty between the NATO nations must be borne
in mind.
First, the Constitution could be amended. The result desired, that
of re-establishing jurisdiction of dependents overseas under the terms of
the treaty, could be accomplished by declaring such civilian dependents
subject to the laws made for the land and naval forces. This would
remove the constitutional objection to article 2(11) of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice. In considering this alternative it should be
remembered, however, that the Constitution is not a prolix code but
is rather an instrument setting forth broad principles to guide a na-
tion.
32
The second alternative which is available would have a very ten-
uous constitutional basis. Some other grant of power, such as the treaty
power,33 could be utilized to establish military jurisdiction over civilian
dependents. A statute similar to article 2(11) of the Uniform Code,
which would implement the treaty, might be framed. The only dif-
ference between article 2(11) and this proposed statute would be the
source of federal power under which it would be enacted. It is doubt-
ful, however, that this would lead to a different result from that
2In order for section 3, n. 28 supra, to apply, the sending and receiving States
must have concurrent jurisdiction. Subsection l(a), n. 28 supra, gives the sending State
this jurisdiction. To qualify under subsection l(a) the person over whom jurisdic-
tion is to be exercised must be subject to the military law of the sending State.
Covert declares that dependents who commit capital crimes in time of peace are
not within article 2(11) of the Code and thus not "subject to the military law of that
State" within the meaning of subsection l(a) supra. This means that subsection i(b)
applies with the effect of granting the receiving State exclusive jurisdiction.
1OPresumably subsection s(a), n. 28 supra, still applies when the crime is less
than capital.
3Justices Black and Frankfurter indicate that there are alternative non-military
means by which dependents might be tried: See 354 U.S. at 14 (amend the Con-
stitution), 33 (war power in time of war), 48 (amend NATO Status of Forces Agree-
ment), 64 (consular courts). Justice Clark concludes that there are no practicable
non-military means. Id. at 86-go.
32Cf. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 415, 422 (1819).
"U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, d. 2.
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reached in Covert. For this reason this alternative seems to be of du-
bious value.
34
Thirdly, the Status of Forces Agreement could be amended. The
quantum of authority which is granted to the sending State in this
agreement is granted only to the military authorities of that State, not
to the sending State as a whole.35 Any amending treaty would thus re-
quire the substitution of sending State authority for sending State mili-
tary authority. Also, since the terms of the agreement grant authority
only over persons subject to the military law of the sending State, all
persons contemplated to be subject to the treaty would have to be
enumerated.30 If these prerequisites to United States jurisdiction were
attained, legislative courts could be set up to try these persons, 37 or
they could be returned to this country and tried by article III
courts.38 Amendment of the Status of Forces Agreement seems to be
the only practical solution to the problem caused by the ruling in
Covert.3
9
The Supreme Court created a result in this case which is out of
keeping with the very theme of its decision-safeguarding the rights of
American citizens abroad.40 The legislative history of the Uniform
Code indicates that Congress intended to grant as many safeguards
to the individual as possible.41 These provisions are always subject
"354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957). Justice Black states that "no agreement with a foreign
nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any other branch of government,
which is free from the restraints of the Constitution." The scope of this comment
does not permit a discussion of the limitations on the treaty-making power. See,
e.g., Tucker, Limitations on the Treaty-Making Power (1915).
3nSee note o8 supra.
E'Ibid.
For the definition of a legislative court see note 12 supra. To satisfy Justice
Black and those Justices who joined in the opinion of the Court, Congress must
embody within these legislative courts safeguards stated in article III, § 2, the fifth
and sixth amendments.
• A statute could authorize the return for trial of civilian dependents. See, e.g., 62
Stat. 826 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 3238 (1951).
a'Cf. Snee and Pye, Status of Forces Agreements and Criminal Jurisdiction 42-43
(1957).
' Snee and Pye, Status of Forces Agreements and Criminal Jurisdiction 44 (1957).
"The Court, therefore, in the Covert and Krueger cases never faced the basic issue.
The majority, as well as the concurring justices, failed to see that the fundamental
choice was not between a federal civilian court and an American court-martial, but
rather between an American court-martial and a foreign court. The high-sounding
sentiments expressed in the majority opinion by Mr. Justice Black represent a
pyrrhic victory: in denying to the United States the right to try these two overseas
dependents by court-martial, the Court has for all practical purposes denied to
other overseas dependents the possibility of trial by any American court, even a
court-martiall"
"Hamilton, Military Law: Drumhead Justice is Deadl, 43 A.B.A.J. 797 (1957)-
19581
